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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, $78-2-2(3)(j) (1988). Appellant appeals from 
the Third District Court's order refusing to lift a 
statutorily-imposed stay and from the court's order affirming an 
administrative denial of claim. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
L Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refus-
ing to lift a statutory stay for a claimant who had not complied 
with the administrative claim procedure mandated by statute and 
whose claim was already on appeal to this Court in a case to 
which the statutory stay was not applicable? 
2. Was it arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law for 
the trial court to affirm the Receiver's denial of a claim for 
contribution that has not yet arisen and that earlier had been 
dismissed by judicial order? 
3. Did Utah's Takeover Act, which provides a compre-
hensive administrative procedure for filing claims against a 
closed bank and provides for timely judicial review of the admin-
istrative decisions, deny appellants due process and access to 
the courts? 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah Code Ann, §7-2-1 et seq., reproduced at A-l of 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the Court's first opportunity to interpret 
Chapter Two of Title Seven of the Utah Code (the "Takeover Act") 
which governs the closing of insolvent state-chartered banks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et seq. The Takeover Act establishes pro-
cedures for the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions, or a 
receiver he appoints, to reorganize or liquidate insolvent banks. 
Appellant Fire Insurance Exchange (the "Insurer") challenges the 
Takeover Statute as applied to its claim for contribution against 
an insolvent bank, Rocky Mountain State Bank (the "Bank"), when 
the claim had been dismissed in district court and was on appeal 
to this Court at the time the Bank was closed. 
In February 1983, the Crookstons, two borrowers whose 
home had collapsed, were suing the Bank and the Insurer for neg-
ligence, intentional torts, and breach of contract. 
[R 142-48]- . The Bank and the Insurer had cross-claimed against 
each other for contribution as joint tortfeasors. 
1/ The format for citations to the Record is [R ]. 
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The Crookston case was set for a May 26, 1987, jury 
trial before Judge Frederick. On May 21, 1987, the Crookstons 
settled with the Bank and the Bank immediately moved for summary 
judgment on the Insurer's cross-claim for contribution. [R 130]. 
The Bank explained that the Crookstons had abandoned their negli-
gence claims against all parties and argued that the Insurer 
could maintain no claim for contribution with respect to inten-
tional torts. Brief of Appellant ("Insurer's Brief") pp. A 
24-25. 
Judge Frederick heard the motion for summary judgment 
on May 26 before the jury was impaneled and granted it on the 
basis that no right of contribution exists among intentional 
tortfeasors under the applicable Utah statute. [R 130]. The 
Insurer objected to the timing of the hearing and appealed from 
the Order granting summary judgment on the cross-claim. That 
appeal, Case No. 870252 ("the Cross-Claim Appeal") presents the 
Insurer's argument about contribution among intentional joint 
tortfeasors. Insurer's Cross-Claim Brief pp. 22-36. 
Following trial in the Crookston case, the jury 
returned a verdict of $4,800,000 against the Insurer. The 
Insurer appealed that verdict and again raised the issue of con-
tribution among intentional joint tortfeasors in Case No. 880034 
(the "Jury Verdict Appeal"). Insurer's Jury Verdict Brief pp. 
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101-114. This Court consolidated the Cross-Claim Appeal and the 
Jury Verdict Appeal on the Insurer's ex-parte application, but 
reversed that ruling on April 18, 1988, after a hearing. 
[R 131-32]. 
Shortly after the Crookston trial, the Bank became 
insolvent. [R 130]. On August 28, 1987, the Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions petitioned for an order approving his tak-
ing possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank pursuant to Utah Code 
Amu §7-2-1 (1986) and S7-2-2 (1987). [R 2]. By sheer coinci-
dence, the Petition came before Judge Frederick. After a hear-
ing, Judge Frederick approved the actions of the Commissioner. 
[R 8]. 
By statutory authority, the Commissioner immediately 
appointed the FDIC as Receiver of the Bank. [R 92-96]. The FDIC 
Receiver entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with 
Citibank Utah whereby Citibank purchased the Bank's "good" assets 
and assumed all of its deposit liabilities. [R 13-19]. The FDIC 
in its corporate capacity purchased from the FDIC Receiver the 
remaining "bad" assets of the bank for $41,000,000. This amount 
was equal to the deposit liabilities assumed by Citibank, less 
the value of the assets purchased by Citibank and less a premium 
of $700,000 paid by Citibank for the Bank's good will. FDIC 
Receiver paid the $41,000,000 to Citibank, and the district court 
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approved the three-cornered transaction after the hearing on 
August 28, 1987. [R 89-91]. 
As required by Utah Code Ann. S7-2-7 (1986), the dis-
trict court Order of August 28, 1987 also ordered a stay of com-
mencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding against the 
Bank. The stay applied to the Cross-Claim Appeal since the Bank 
was a named party. During the time the Cross-Claim Appeal was 
consolidated with the Jury Verdict Appeal, the stay applied to 
both actions. 
The Cross Claim Appeal presents two arguments. One is 
the 14-page argument about contribution which is presented word 
for word in the Jury Verdict Appeal and in this appeal as well. 
Insurer's Cross Claim Brief pp. 22-36; Insurer's Jury Verdict 
Brief pp. 101-114. The other argument is that the Insurer had 
insufficient time to respond to the Bank's motion for summary 
judgment. Insurer's Cross-Claim Brief pp. 10-21. That argument 
is also raised verbatim in the Jury Verdict Appeal. Insurer's 
Jury Verdict Brief pp. 89-100. 
The Receiver posted the notice of taking as required by 
S7-2-6U), [R 97-98], and published the Notice to Creditors 
required by §7-2-6(2). [R 195-96]. The notice advised all per-
sons with a claim to present their claims to the Receiver 
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pursuant to §7-2-6 which mandates that all claims against a 
closed bank go through administrative process. 
No notice by mail was sent to the Insurer since its 
name did not appear on the Bank's records as a creditor of the 
Bank and since the FDIC Receiver had no actual knowledge of the 
pendency of the Cross-Claim Appeal. [R 183 ]« Section 7-2-6(2) 
requires mailing of notice only to persons whose names appear as 
depositors or other creditors upon the books and records of the 
institution. 
On March 9, 1988, the Insurer moved to lift the statu-
tory stay of the Cross-Claim Appeal. [R 1151. The Receiver 
opposed lifting the stay on the ground that the Insurer's claim 
for contribution should first be filed with the Receiver pursuant 
to §7-2-6. [R 184-184]. Judge Frederick, sitting as the §7-2-2 
supervisory court, denied the Insurer's motion to lift the stay 
on May 16, 1988. [R 211-212]. Judge Frederick's Order cited the 
fact that the Supreme Court had de-consolidated the Jury Verdict 
and Cross-Claim Appeals. Id. The district court was responsive 
to the Insurer's desire to get its contribution argument before 
the Supreme Court. [R 588 pp. 12-14]. When the two appeals were 
no longer consolidated, the Jury Verdict Appeal, containing the 
contribution argument, was not affected by the stay. 
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In its motion to lift the stay, the Insurer claimed 
that its Cross-Claim Appeal constituted a claim with the 
Receiver. The Receiver notified the Insurer that an appeal does 
not constitute a claim as required by $7-2-6 and that any claim 
evidenced by the appeal was denied because the claim had not yet 
arisen and because a district court order had dismissed the 
claim. [R 542-43). The Receiver also advised the Insurer in 
writing of its right to appeal to the district court under Sec-
tion 7-2-6(9). 
On May 16, 1988, the Insurer filed a §7-2-6 claim with 
the Receiver. [R 206-7]. The Insurer asserted that it "may be 
entitled to a right of contribution against Rocky Mountain State 
Bank" and that the Bank "may become obligated to pay Fire Insur-
ance Exchange in the future." (Emphasis added). [R 206]. 
The Receiver denied the claim because no claim for con-
tribution had arisen and because a district court order had dis-
missed the claim. [R 539-43]. The Receiver also advised the 
Insurer that objections to denial would be heard at a Section 
7-2-6(9) hearing set for August 1, 1988. After that hearing, the 
court affirmed denial of the claim [R 547-8], and the Insurer 
appealed the order denying the claim as well as the order denying 
the motion to lift the statutory stay. [R 551]. The Insurer 
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did not move to lift the stay after it complied with the adminis-
trative procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Insurer appeals from two orders issued pursuant to 
the Takeover Act (Utah Code Ann, S7-2-1 et seq.); One order 
maintains a statutory stay and the other upholds the Receiver's 
decision to deny the Insurer's claim for contribution. 
The court did not abuse its discretion when it found no 
cause to lift a stay in circumstances where the claimant had not 
complied with administrative process mandated by statute and 
where the claimant's issue was already on appeal to this Court in 
the Jury Verdict Appeal. When Rocky Mountain State Bank was 
closed, the Takeover Act changed the procedure for resolving the 
Insurer's claim for contribution, but the Insurer's substantive 
rights are preserved in this appeal and in the Jury Verdict 
Appeal« Hearing three appeals instead of two can only add to 
this Court's burden and cannot give the Insurer any relief beyond 
that which it has sought in the two appeals this Court will hear. 
The Insurer's claim for contribution was correctly 
denied on the basis that it had not yet arisen and that there was 
a prior judgment dismissing the claim. The rights and liabili-
ties of an insolvent bank and its creditors are fixed at the date 
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of insolvency and no additional rights can be created after court 
determination of a bank's insolvency. 
Denial of the Insurer's claim for contribution, pursu-
ant to the Takeover Act, did not deny due process or access to 
the courts. The Takeover Act provides administrative due process 
and prompt judicial review of administrative decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION 
IN FINDING NO CAUSE TO LIFT THE STAY 
The Takeover Act provides a comprehensive scheme for 
closing failed banks and for filing and processing claims of 
interested parties. The statutory scheme includes an automatic 
stay of any action against the failed bank and allows modifica-
tion of the stay for cause shown. 
The district court's order denying the Insurer's Motion 
to Lift the Stay stated that no cause had been shown to lift the 
stay. This Court reviews the district court's mixed finding of 
fact/conclusion of law of "no cause" by an abuse of discretion 
standard. Marqulies By and Through Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). 
The district court properly exercised its discretion in 
finding no cause to lift the stay because the Insurer had not 
-9-
made an administrative claim for contribution required by §7-2-6 
and because the issue of contribution was already before this 
Court in the Jury Verdict Appeal. The stay issue is now moot 
because, although the Insurer eventually did comply with adminis-
trative process, it did not seek to lift the stay following 
compliance. 
A. THE STATUTORY STAY CANNOT BE LIFTED FOR A CLAIMANT WHO HAS 
NOT COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE 
The Takeover Act provides that "the court may, for 
cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or condition1* the auto-
matic stay. Utah Code Ann, §7-2-7(1) (1986). Cause to lift the 
stay must be reviewed in light of the purpose for imposing the 
stay. The statutory stay, like the stay in bankruptcy, is 
imposed to compel compliance with the statutory scheme, which 
includes a requirement that all claimants file their claims with 
the Receiver. Utah Code Ann. S7-2-6 (1987). The Insurer asked 
the court to lift the stay even though it had not filed the 
required claim, and the Receiver opposed lifting the stay because 
the Insurer had failed to file the required claim. 
The closing of Rocky Mountain State Bank in August 1987 
changed the Insurer's procedural rights much as a debtor's filing 
for bankruptcy changes a creditor's procedural rights. When the 
Bank was closed for insolvency, the Takeover Act stayed 
-10-
litigation and substituted an administrative procedure for con-
sideration of claims, with a right to judicial review of the 
Receiver's allowance or disallowance of a claim. Utah Code Ann. 
§7-2-6(9) (1987). 
When statutes change procedure after initiation of a 
suit, if the changes "do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested or contractual rights,11 they apply "not only to future 
actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well." 
Pilcher v. State Department of Public Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1983); State Department of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656 
P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982). Clearly a statute already in effect, 
like the Takeover Act, legitimately changed the Insurer's proce-
dural rights. The Insurer's substantive rights were not changed 
because it had no vested right to contribution when the Bank 
closed. See Uniqard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 
1344 (Utah 1984). 
Judge Frederick refused to lift the stay, in part, 
because the Insurer had not exhausted its administrative reme-
dies. After the Insurer complied with the administrative claim 
procedure, it did not petition to court to lift the stay. Thus, 
it is in no position to complain about the original refusal to 
lift the stay. 
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B. THERE IS NO CAUSE TO LIFT A STAY WHEN THE ISSUE STAYED IS 
ALREADY ON APPEAL 
The Insurer argues that the Cross-Claim Appeal should 
go forward so that it can appeal the question of whether it has a 
right of contribution* In his Order denying the motion to lift 
the stay, Judge Frederick cited the fact that the Supreme Court, 
upon hearing, revoked consolidation of the Cross-Claim Appeal and 
the Jury Verdict Appeal. [R 209]. The Judge concluded that if 
the Insurer had one appeal pending on the question of whether 
contribution exists between intentional tortfeasors, there was no 
cause to lift the stay and allow a second appeal of the issue. 
Since the Jury Verdict Appeal has been briefed and 
remains only to be argued, the Insurer will get a ruling from the 
Supreme Court on the contribution-among-joint-tortfeasors ques-
tion. Lifting the statutory stay to allow the Insurer to pro-
ceed with the Cross-Claim Appeal would not give the Insurer any 
relief it has not requested in the appeal already pending. If 
the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants, this Court has held the case moot. Jones v. 
Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986). 
As noted, the Jury Verdict Appeal presents exactly the 
same 14-page argument on the Insurer's right to contribution that 
is presented in the Cross-Claim Appeal and again in this case. 
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The contribution argument is properly before the Court in the 
Jury Verdict Appeal since the merits were argued to the trial 
courto However, in this case, the merits of the argument were 
not raised below. 
The Insurer's Brief implies that the merits were pre-
sented below as a basis for lifting the stay: 
Fire Insurance Exchange, in seeking to have 
the stay lifted below, represented to the 
Court that its research demonstrated that the 
Court's ruling was in error on a critical 
substantive issue, i.e., whether contribution 
exists between intentional tortfeasors. (R. 
588). 
Insurer's Brief, p. 11. However, the Insurer's citation to the 
Record at 588 is simply the Insurer telling the Court it wants to 
appeal the question of whether contribution exists between inten-
tional tortfeasors; it does not include any representation about 
research or about the merits of the issue. [R 588 pp. 1-24]. 
Since the merits of the question of contribution were 
not mentioned in the pleadings, at the hearing on the Motion to 
Lift the Stay or in the court's order, that issue is not properly 
before the Court in this Appeal and the Court should simply dis-
regard Section I-A of the Insurer's brief. Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah, 1984). However, 
for the record, the FDIC notes a fundamental flaw in the 
Insurer's contribution argument. 
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1. The Insurer Has No Clear Right of 
Contribution Under Utah Law 
The Insurer labels as "clearly erroneous" the trial 
court's conclusion that Utah Code Ann, S78-27-39 (as in effect 
from 1973-1986) excludes intentional tortfeasors. However, the 
Insurer presents no statement from Utah statute or case law that 
Utah's former Comparative Negligence Statute, of which §78-27-39 
was a part, was intended to apply to intentional tortfeasors. 
The Insurer's analysis ignores the title of the act 
which reads as followst 
Title of Acto 
An act relating to actions for the 
recovery of damages in actions based on neg-
ligence or gross negligence? removing con-
tributory negligence as a bar to any recovery 
under certain circumstances; providing for 
the diminishing of any recovery in proportion 
to the negligence of the person seeking 
recovery; providing for separate judgments as 
to damages in proportionate negligence; pro-
viding for contribution among joint 
tortfeasors; providing for the release of one 
or more joint tortfeasors without releasing 
them all; and providing for the effect of 
such releases on other joint tortfeasors. L. 
1973 Ch. 209. (Emphasis added.) 
Since by its terms the act relates only to actions based on neg-
ligence, the Insurer's citations from other jurisdictions whose 
statutes are not so limited and from the Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act are not persuasive. 
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The Insurer quotes from Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349, 1351 (Utah 1986) a passage that calls the 
negligence/contribution act by its official name: the "Utah Com-
parative Negligence Act," (emphasis added), but offers no expla-
nation why the actss name excludes intentional tortfeasors. 
C. THE INSUREDS DESIRE TO KEEP THE BANK IN THE UNDERLYING 
ACTION PROVIDES NO CAUSE FOR LIFTING THE STAY, 
The Insurer confuses its general sense of ill usage 
with a right to specific relief when it argues in this appeal 
that it has a right to require the Bank to remain as a defendant 
in the underlying action. Neither of the orders from which the 
Insurer appeals in this case addresses the question of whether 
the Bank should have remained a defendant in the underlying 
action. 
The refusal to lift the statutory stay was based on the 
Insurer's failure to comply with the $7-2-6 claims procedure. 
The denial of the Insurer's claim for contribution was based on 
an existing order and on the fact that the Insurer had not paid 
more than a prorata share of a judgment at the time the Bank was 
closed. Neither of the district court's orders has anything to 
do with whether the same jury that decides an underlying action 
should decide third-party claims. 
-15-
The Insurer properly raised the question of a right to 
have all the facts before the same tribunal in its Jury Verdict 
Appeal. Insurer's Jury Verdict Brief pp. 115-116, But by 
reversing either the order upholding the stay or the order deny-
ing the claim, this Court would have no impact on the question of 
whether liability of the Bank to the Insurer should be decided in 
the underlying action. 
The Insurer states that although there is no Utah case 
on point, it has a "vested right" to retain the Bank as a party 
Defendant in the underlying action. Insurer's Brief p. 26. Con-
trary to the Insurer's assertion, a Utah case holds exactly the 
oppositec A party cannot claim a vested right in a claim that 
does not yet exist; and this Court has held: 
If one named as a defendant tortfeasor 
impleads another alleged joint tortfeasor, 
the defendant in the initial action does so, 
not on the ground that a claim for relief 
then exists against the third-party defen-
dant, but on the ground that the third-party 
defendant "may be liable" to the defendant in 
the principal action. 
Uniqard Insurance Company v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 
1346 N.2 (Utah, 1984). 
This Court has also held that the Comparative Negli-
gence Act does not "mandate that the plaintiff must obtain juris-
diction over all the tortfeasors and bring them to trial so that 
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the proportion of fault of each may be there determined," Cruz 
v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1983). 
Although the Insurer claims a "vested" right, the 
authorities the Insurer cites refer only to convenience and judi-
cial efficiency* Insurer's Brief pp. 26-34* No case uses the 
word "vest." The Insurer attempts to convert Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure — which permits a third-party claim to 
be decided together with the underlying claim — into a vested 
right to contribution. The authorities cited by the Insurer, 
however, specifically hold that impleader "merely accelerates the 
determination of liability and does not have the effect of 
enlarging any substantive rights." Patten v. Knutzen, 646 F. 
Supp 427, 430 (D. Colo. 1986); C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, S1448, pp. 263-65. (1971) (emphasis 
added). 
Rule 14 may allow accelerated determination of liabil-
ity if the third-party plaintiff can satisfy the court that the 
alleged joint tortfeasor "may be" liable to the third-party 
plaintiff. Rule 14 does not give a third-party plaintiff a 
vested right of contribution. 
D. DUE STATUTORY NOTICE WAS PROVIDED AND THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF 
THE STATUTORY STAY. 
The Insurer alleges as "cause" to lift the stay the 
theory that counsel for the Bank waived the stay by failing to 
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promptly notify the Insurer of the stay. Insurer's Brief p. 35. 
That contention has no merit. The stay is mandated by statute 
and cannot be waived by an insolvent Bank's counsel. The 
Receiver, not Bank counsel, relied on the stay and opposed the 
Insurer's motion to lift the stay in order to protect the 
Receiver's rights, duties and obligations in administering the 
Bank under Utah law* 
Once the insolvent Bank was closed and the FDIC was 
appointed as Receiver, the rights and obligations of the closed 
bank were the responsibility of the Receiver, not of the attor-
neys employed in the Crookston case prior to the Bank's closing 
by the Bank's liability insurance carrier. The Receiver had no 
knowledge of the Cross-Claim Appeal until the Insurer filed its 
motion to lift the stay. It then opposed lifting the stay. That 
conduct is no "waiver" of the statutory stay. 
E. THE INSURER PRESENTS THE COURT WITH THE "WHOLE 
PICTURE" IN ITS JURY VERDICT APPEAL. 
The Insurer argues that it may suffer prejudice in hav-
ing to present its claims piecemeal. Again, neither order 
appealed from offers any relief from piecemeal presentation. 
Furthermore, the Insurer's Jury Verdict Appeal raises all the 
issues addressed in the Cross-Claim Appeal. What the Insurer is 
really insisting on is a right to raise every claim three times. 
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The Insurer's desire to present the "whole picture" thrice to 
this Court gives no legitimate cause to lift the stay. 
II 
THE RECEIVER PROPERLY DENIED THE INSURER'S 
CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE BANK'S ASSETS 
The Insurer appeals from the district court's order 
affirming disallowance of its §7-2-6 claim for contribution 
against the Bank's assets in the possession of the Receiver. 
Since the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to actions 
or review of actions under the Takeover Act, Utah Code Ann. 
S63-46b-l(2)(h), the Takeover Act itself prescribes the scope of 
review of the order affirming the Receiver's denial of the 
Insurer's claim for contribution. The FDIC as Receiver stands in 
the shoes of the Commissioner, Utah Code Ann. §7-2-9(1) (1987), 
and the court "may not overrule a determination or decision of 
the Commissioner if it is not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, 
or contrary to law."-'' Utah Code Ann. §7-2-2(4) (1987). 
The Insurer acknowledges that before the Bank's insol-
vency, Judge Frederick entered an order denying contribution 
among intentional tortfeasors. The Insurer also admits in the 
The 1989 Amendments to § 7-2-6(9) (SB185) expressly 
made that criterion applicable to review of decisions of a 
receiver allowing or disallowing claims. Utah Code Ann. § 
7-2-6(9)(c), effective May 1, 1989. 
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very language of its claim filed with the Receiver that its claim 
for contribution is one to which it "may be entitled" and that 
the Bank "may become obligated to pay Fire Insurance Exchange in 
the future*" [R 206]. In its Brief to this Court, the Insurer 
concedes the claim "might have technically remained in an incho-
ate state0" Insurer's Brief p. 38. In light of these admissions, 
the Insurer cannot claim the Receiver's decision to deny the 
claim was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. 
Ae RES JUDICATA REQUIRED THE RECEIVER TO DENY THE 
INSURER'S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION, 
The only legal precedent in Utah that addresses the 
question of contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors is 
the district court's 1987 ruling that there is no contribution 
among intentional tortfeasors. The Receiver correctly cited that 
decision as a basis for denying the Insurer's claim for contribu-
tion against an alleged intentional joint tortfeasor. The 
Receiver made the only decision it could make in light of the law 
that governed when it made its decision. 
When summary judgment adjudicates a claim on its mer-
its, the judgment invokes the doctrine of res judicata. Makin v. 
Liddle, 696 P.2d 918,919 (Idaho App. 1985); Seeborq v. General 
Motors Corp., 588 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1978); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments §19, Comment (g) (1980). Furthermore, even if 
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a judgment is later overruled by an appellate court, it is none-
theless conclusive while it stands. El Paso Natural Gas v. 
State, 599 P.2d 175, 178 (Ariz. 1979); C. Wright and A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §4433 (1971). 
Thus Judge Frederick's order, which granted summary 
judgment and ruled that there is no right of contribution among 
intentional tortfeasors, is res judicata on the question unless 
and until this Court reverses the ruling. 
B. NO RIGHT OF ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION HAS ARISEN 
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act in effect when the 
underlying tort was committed provided: 
(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tortfeasors but a joint 
tortfeasor shall not be entitled to a money 
judgment for contribution until he has, by 
payment, discharged the common liability or 
more than his prorata share thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. S78-27-39U) [repealed 1986]. 
This Court has interpreted that passage as creating a 
new cause of action, but only in a tortfeasor who has already 
paid more than his prorata share of a common liability. Brunyer 
v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 1976). The Brunyer 
Court held that a claimant had no right to contribution because 
that claimant had not discharged more than a prorata share of a 
common liability before enactment of the Comparative Negligence 
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Act which established the right to contribution, ^d. The act 
does not create a cause of action for contribution in a 
tortfeasor, like the Insurer, who has not paid any portion of a 
judgment and who has not even obtained a judgment that the bank 
is jointly liable. 
The FDIC as Receiver correctly denied the Insurer's 
claim for contribution because "irrespective of when the underly-
ing tort action arises, a claim for contribution 'arises1 only 
when a defendant meets the conditions specified by the Compara-
tive Negligence Act" Citing Uniqard Insurance Co. v. City of 
Laverkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984). [R 539-40]. Uniqard 
makes it clear that the right of contribution does not arise when 
the tort occurs, but rather arises "to rectify the inequity 
resulting when one tortfeasor pays more than his share of the 
common liability*" 689 P.2d at 1346. No such inequity has 
occurred in this case. 
The Uniqard Court explained that when one tortfeasor 
impleads another alleged joint tortfeasor, he does so "not on the 
ground that a claim for relief then exists against the 
third-party defendant, but on the ground that the third party 
defendant 'may be liable'" to the tortfeasor. Id. at N.2. 
(Emphasis added). 
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The Insurer admits its right to contribution "might 
have technically remained in an inchoate state" pending its pay-
ment of more than its prorata share of the Crookston judgment. 
Insurer's Brief p. 38. But payment of the Crookston judgment is 
only one of many steps separating the Insurer from a right of 
contribution. At this stage, the amount of a final judgment 
against the Insurer is still uncertain* Second, this Court must 
overturn the district court's ruling that intentional joint 
tortfeasors are barred from contribution. Then the Insurer must 
persuade a jury that the Bank committed some intentional tort in 
common with the Insurer, even though the tort plaintiff asserted 
no claim against the Bank. The Insurer has no vested claim 
against the Bank. 
C. NO RIGHT OF ACTION CAN BE CREATED AFTER A BANK'S INSOLVENCY 
The Receiver's notice of denial further pointed out, 
"It is well settled that the rights and liabilities of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank and its creditors are fixed at the declara-
tion of insolvency and no additional rights can be created after 
such insolvency." Citing FDIC v. McKniqht. 769 F.2d 658, 661 
(10th Cir. 1985). [R 540]. 
In the McKniqht case the Tenth Circuit determined the 
rights of holders of cashier's checks issued shortly before the 
bank was closed: 
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The seminal point is the closing of Penn Square. 
That event not only triggered the liquidation pro-
cess, but also cast in stone the relationship of 
defendants to the bank. "It is well settled that 
the rights and liabilities of a bank and the 
bank's debtors and creditors are fixed at the dec-
laration of the bank's insolvencye" 
769 Fo2d at 661, Citing American National Bank of Jacksonville v. 
FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983). 
American National Bank involved claims to assets of a 
closed state banke The Eleventh Circuit held that the claimant's 
'
fattempt to rely on events subsequent to the bank's closing in 
support of its claim of ownership to the escrow fund must fail 
since the rights of the parties were frozen on April 13, 1970, 
when the bank's doors were shut to business." 710 F.2d at 
1540-41, 
The reason for freezing rights with respect to national 
banks is based on 12 U.ScC. S194 which requires payment of claims 
on a prorata basis. If claims that had not yet arisen could be 
recognized, the Receiver could not make any interim prorata pay-
ments to creditors until all the uncertainties and contingencies 
were resolved. 
A similar reason applies to Utah chartered banks. The 
FDIC as Receiver has authority under federal law, 12 U.S.C. 
S1823, and state law, S7-2-9(2)(b), to enter into purchase and 
assumption agreements whereby another bank assumes the closed 
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bank's deposit and other liabilities* Such an arrangement would 
not be feasible if claims that had not yet arisen could be 
asserted. Under federal law, 12 U.S.C. $1823, the FDIC must make 
a decision at the time of closing whether a purchase and assump-
tion procedure or a straight liquidation is preferable. Such a 
decision must be made with great speed, usually overnight, in 
order to preserve the going concern value of the failed bank and 
avoid interruption in banking services. Lanqley v. FDICf 484 
U.Se _ , 98 L.Ed.2d 340, 347 (1987). 
In addition, under §7-2-16, a receiver may declare 
interim dividends to proven claimants. No such procedure could 
be followed if claimants could assert claims based on 
post-closing events. 
The Utah legislature in the original enactment of 
$7-2-6 did not expressly codify the well-settled rule that rights 
are frozen on the date of takeover. However, the 1989 legisla-
ture clarified its position: "The rights of claimants and the 
amount of a claim shall be determined as of the date the Commis-
sioner took possession of the institution under this Chapter." 
Utah Code Ann. S7-2-6(4)(c) (1989). The Receiver's application 
of the well-settled rule to the Insurer's claim has been ratified 
by the Utah legislature. 
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Ill 
UTAKTS TAKEOVER ACT PRESERVES THE INSURER'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Point II of the Insurer's Brief contends that implemen-
tation of the Takeover Act unconstitutionally deprived it of due 
process under the Federal and State Constitutions and violated 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution as to access to 
the courts. 
Ae CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
An appellant may not raise before this Court issues it 
did not raise in district court, Bundy v. Century Equipment Co. 
Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). No reference to due process 
was made in any of the proceedings, and the Insurer did not refer 
to Section 11 in asking the district court to reverse the 
Receiver's decision on the claim for contribution. 
The constitutional issues on which the Insurer now 
relies were given only cursory presentation to the Court belowf 
and the Court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law on 
the constitutional issues. In such circumstances, this Court 
should not consider the appeal. Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 at 672c 
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Limited reference to the constitutional doctrines in 
the district court, without any analysis before that court, does 
not meet this Court's standards for appellate review. State v. 
Johnson, 771 Pc2d 362 (Utah App. 1989); James v. Preston, 746 
P02d 799, 802 (Utah App. 1987). Nevertheless, the FDIC has 
briefed the issue for this Court's consideration. 
B, THE TAKEOVER ACT PROVIDES REASONABLE PROCEDURES FOR 
CLAIMS AGAINST A CLOSED BANK 
The Takeover Statute (Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq.) 
establishes the following reasonable remedies by due course of 
laws 
(1) Takeover of insolvent depository institutions by 
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (§7-2-1); 
(2) Designation of a court to have jurisdiction over 
the liquidation of the institution and the acts of the Com-
missioner and any receiver or liquidator appointed by the 
Commissioner ($7-2-2); 
(3) Appointment of a receiver or liquidator with 
appropriate powers and duties (§§7-2-9, 7-2-10 and 7-2-12); 
(4) Notice of the taking, notice to file claims, the 
procedure for handling claims and judicial review of deter-
minations by the receiver in allowing or disallowing claims 
(§7-2-6); 
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(5) Stay of court proceedings against the institution 
to enable the receiver to marshal the assets of the closed 
bank and to provide for an orderly liquidation without 
interference from litigation (§7-2-7); and 
(6) Establishment of priority for the payment of 
claims against the institution (§7-2-15). 
Subject only to secured claims, administrative 
expenses, and unpaid wage claims for the 90-day period prior to 
the closing, depositors' claims are given first priority by 
§7-2-15o Since the FDIC is the insurer of these claims, 
§7-2=9(2) authorizes the Commissioner to appoint the FDIC as 
receiver or liquidator. The receiver may enter into purchase and 
assumption agreements with another financial institution to allow 
3/ depositors uninterrupted access to their accounts.-
1/ Following the Rocky Mountain State Bank purchase and 
assumption transaction, the receiver has no assets to meet 
the claims of Bank creditors. Whether any assets will be 
available to pay claims subordinate to depositor claims as 
defined in § 7-2-15 depends on the success of the FDIC in 
liquidating the assets it purchased from the receiver to 
carry out the purchase and assumption transaction. A simi-
lar procedure has been followed in the other ten Utah banks 
closed since 1984, involving over $100,000,000 advanced by 
the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer of the closed 
banks' deposit liabilities. This procedure has protected 
all deposits, even those exceeding the $100,000 insurance 
limit. 
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The Takeover Act's above comprehensive scheme 
offers due process and full court access as further explained 
below. 
C. THE TAKEOVER ACT SATISFIES DUE PROCESS AND OPEN COURT 
REQUIREMENTS 
Between March 9, 1988, when the Insurer sought to lift 
the stay and September 2, 1988, when this appeal was filed, the 
Insurer filed its administrative claim, received an administra-
tive decision, and had two full hearings in district court. The 
Insurer received due process and full access to the courts. 
1. The Insurer Obtained Timely Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Process 
In Coit Independent Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 57 U.S.L.W. 
4347 (March 21, 1989), the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
the validity of an administrative procedure established by regu-
lations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for handling claims 
against insolvent savings and loan associations. The FSLIC, 
insurer of savings and loan deposits, had acted as receiver. The 
Supreme Court found that mandating an administrative procedure 
for the processing of claims against the assets of a closed sav-
ings and loan association was a reasonable exercise of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board's authority. It concluded the Board 
could reasonably determine that FSLIC as receiver "simply cannot 
perform its statutory function unless it is notified of the 
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entire array of claims against a failed association's assets and 
has a reasonable period of time to make rational and consistent 
judgments regarding those claims." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4353. 
The Supreme Court found the FSLIC claims procedure to 
be inadequate only insofar as the regulations failed to provide a 
"clear and reasonable time limit11 on FSLIC*s consideration of 
claims, thus unreasonably denying claimants their day in court. 
57 UoScL.We 4347 at 4353. 
In contrast, Utah's S7-2-6 clearly establishes a time 
limit for the receiver to adjudicate claims. The receiver must 
act on claims within 180 days after final publication of notice. 
Utah Code Ann. §7-2-6(4) (1987)e The receiver must give notice 
of its determination within 30 days after determination, and if a 
claimant has not received notice of disallowance within 210 days 
of the date of final publication of notice, the claim is consid-
ered allowed. Id. The district court reviews the receiver's 
decision. $7-2-6(9) (1987). 
In the case at bar, the Insurer had a court determina-
tion of the validity of its claim within 90 days of its date of 
filing. Part of the 90 days was spent briefing and arguing the 
merits of the claim before the district court. 
When the district court approved denial of the 
Insurer's claim, it rendered moot its earlier order refusing to 
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lift the statutory stay pending administrative resolution of the 
Insurer's claim by the Receiver. The Insurer's claim for contri-
bution has been heard by the Receiver and the Receiver's determi-
nation has been reviewed by the district court and is now before 
this Court on appeal. 
2. The Insurer's "Right" of Contribution is not an 
Accrued, Individual Right Protected by the Constitution 
The Insurer cites Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), to support its assertion that the Takeover 
Act denies it due process and access to Court. However, Berry 
specifies that the constitutional protections operate only "once 
a cause of action . . . accrues to a person by virtue of an 
injury to his rights. . . . " Id. at 676. The "rights" protected 
by the Open Courts provision are "injuries done to the substan-
tive interests of person, property, and reputation." _Id. at N.4. 
In Berry, the substantive interest at issue was the 
Plaintiffs' right to bring a wrongful death action. By contrast, 
the Insurer claims constitutional protection attaches to a 
"right" of contribution which has not accrued, arisen, or vested 
and which is not a fundamental personal or property right but is 
merely designed to adjust the economic burden among tortfeasors 
once common liability has been adjudicated. 
3. The Takeover Act Provides Effective, Reasonable Alter-
native Remedies for Vindication of Any Constitutional 
Interest 
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Before a constitutional remedy can be abrogated, Berry 
requires either an effective, reasonable alternative remedy or a 
need to eliminate a clear social or economic evil. Id. at 680. 
The first question is whether any constitutional remedy has been 
abrogated in this case. 
The Insurer contends that the Takeover Act denied its 
right to maintain an action for contribution against the Bank. 
However, the Insurer has no such right because it has not paid a 
common liability* Furthermore, it was first the district 
court—not the Takeover Act—that denied the claim for contribu-
tion, and the Receiver simply followed legal precedent. The 
Insurer is characterizing as a constitutional complaint what is 
merely the Insurer's disagreement with the district court's deci-
sion,, The Insurer has enjoyed open courts and due process; it 
simply does not like the outcome of the process. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that some remedy 
has been abrogated, the Takeover Act provides the effective, rea-
sonable remedies by due course of law required by Berry. The 
prompt administrative decision followed by prompt judicial review 
that the Insurer received is by definition effective, reasonable 
and due course of law. 
As noted above, the Coit decision found the only defect 
in FSLIC's procedure to be a lack of reasonable time limit for 
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completion of the administrative procedure,. That defect does not 
exist in the Utah statutory scheme. 
4. The Takeover Act Eliminates a Clear Economic Evil. 
The "social and economic evil" analysis outlined in 
Berry is applicable only "...if there is no substitute or alter-
native remedy provided. . . . " 717 P.2d at 680. Again, assuming 
for purposes of argument that the Insurer had a constitutional 
remedy before the Bank closed, the effective substitute remedy 
provided by the Utah statutory procedure in §7-2-1 et seq. has 
been followed to the letter. The Insurer had its day in court at 
the district court level and is now appealing that decision. 
Although there is no need to reach the "social or eco-
nomic evil" test, the Takeover Act eliminates economic evils. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Coit "the social or 
economic evil" of litigation against the receiver without afford-
ing the receiver notice "of the entire array of claims against a 
failed association [bank's] assets and reasonable period of time 
to make rational and consistent judgments regarding those 
claims." 57 U.S.L.W. 4347 at 4353. 
Another economic evil eliminated by the statutory stay 
of litigation against the Receiver is the wasting of the 
Receiver's assets. The cost of defending litigation against the 
Receiver constitutes administrative expense. Administrative 
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expenses have priority over deposit and other claims against the 
Bank. Utah Code Ann. £7-2-15(1)(b) (1987). Thus, absent the 
stay, assets of the insolvent bank would be consumed in defending 
litigation aimed at establishing claims which the legislature has 
determined have a lesser priority than depositors' claims. 
With respect to the "social and economic evil" test, 
the Insurer states that "the Insurer understands and admits that 
the bank represents that it has no assets available to satisfy 
any portion of the $4.8 Million judgment entered in the related 
underlying action." Insurer's Brief p. 41. It is true that the 
Receiver lacks Bank assets because the purchase and assumption 
agreement with Citibank was necessary to meet depositor claims 
under §7-2-15. However, if the Insurer is found to be entitled 
to a claim against the closed Bank's assets, the Insurer would 
receive a Receiver's certificate evidencing the claim. 
The Receiver's certificate would be payable, subject to 
the priorities set by §7-2-15 and the provisions of the agreement 
whereby the FDIC purchased the "bad" assets of the bank not pur-
chased by Citibank, from any recoveries by the FDIC on the closed 
Bank's assets. That would be true of all claims filed and 
approved by the Receiver under §7-2-6. The imposition of the 
stay until the Insurer filed its §7-2-6 claim in May 1988 in no 
way affected that result. 
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The Takeover Act provides constitutional due process 
and access to the courts* Its implementation by the Receiver in 
this case did not deprive the Insurer of any constitutional 
right, 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court upholds Judge Frederick's ruling on con-
tribution among intentional joint tortfeasors when it considers 
the Jury Verdict Appeal, the Insurer has no claim for contribu-
tion and no basis for appeal in this case or in the Cross-Claim 
Appeal. If the Court allows contribution among intentional 
tortfeasors, the orders appealed from in this case were still 
correct when made. 
The FDIC asks the Court to affirm the Order refusing to 
lift the stay because it was an appropriate exercise of the 
court's discretion and to affirm the Order affirming the 
Receiver's disallowance of claim because it was not arbitrary, 
capricious or contrary to law. 
DATED this 3 0 day of May, 1989. 
Peter W. Billings 
Michele Mitchell 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, a 
Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
139 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 7-1-807 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the commis-
sioner, any supervisor, or any examiner of the depart-
ment may: 
(a) have and maintain savings, transaction, or 
other accounts, or certificates and deposits in any 
financial or depository institution in the state, or 
a share or share draft account in any credit union 
in the state, or a thrift savings account or own 
any thrift certificates of deposit in any industrial 
loan corporation, or be a lessee of a safe deposit 
box on the same terms and conditions available 
to the public generally; 
(b) be indebted to a savings and loan associa-
tion, bank, or other institution under the super-
vision of the department upon (i) a mortgage loan 
upon the mortgagor's own home; and (ii) an in-
stallment debt transferred to an institution in 
the regular course of business by a seller of con-
sumer goods; and 
(c) continue to receive payments under a regu-
larly established pension plan of general applica-
tion for fully retired employees of an institution 
under the supervision of the department. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) any supervisor 
or examiner may be indebted to any institution under 
the supervision of the department if: (a) the loan is 
obtained under the same circumstances, conditions, 
and terms available at the time to the general public, 
(b) the loan is a consumer loan as defined in Section 
70B-3-4, (c) the loan is for the personal use of the 
supervisor or examiner, his spouse, or dependent chil-
dren, (d) in the case of examiners, the loan is not 
obtained from a class of institutions normally exam-
ined by the examiner, and (e) in the case of supervi-
sors, the loan is not obtained from an institution un-
der his supervision. 
(4) Full disclosure in writing of any indebtedness 
incurred under Subsection (2) or (3) shall be filed in 
the commissioner's office. 
(5) Any person who violates this section shall for-
feit h is office or employment and is gui l ty of a th i rd 
degree felony. 1983 
7-1-804. Malfeasance or nonfeasance by com-
missioner, supervisor or examiner as 
misdemeanor — Removal from office. 
If the commissioner, a supervisor, or an examiner 
wilfully neglects to perform any duty provided for by 
law, or knowingly or wilfully permits the violation of 
any of the provisions of law for a period of 90 days by 
any institution under the supervision of the depart-
ment, or knowingly or wilfully makes any false state-
ment concerning any such institution, or is guilty of 
any misconduct or corruption in office, he or she is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and shall be re-
moved from office by the governor. 1981 
7-1-805. Repealed. 1983 
7-1-806. Money market funds arranging with 
bank to honor two-party instruments 
— Discouraging payment of interest to 
two persons on funds in transit — Pyr-
amiding and similar schemes as misde-
meanors. 
from paying interest to two persons at the same time 
on funds in the process of transfer. 
The process or the practice referred to as pyramid-
ing or any similar process or practice as defined by 
the commissioner, and such definition is approved by 
the governor, shall be prohibited within this state 
and persons found guilty of these schemes shall be 
found guilty of a class C misdemeanor. This shall not 
preclude more serious punishment under federal law. 
Money market funds, similar funds and bank regu-
lated institutions shall cooperate with the commis-
sioner to stop these practices. 1981 
7-1-807. Printed checks, drafts and orders — 
Requirements — Violation as misde-
meanor. 
Every check, draft, order, or other like instrument 
printed for a customer of any institution issuing 
transaction accounts in the state as part of a series 
after the effective date of this act shall have on its 
face the name and address of the account holder, the 
month and year the account was opened, and the 
number of the check, draft, order, or other like instru-
ment in unbroken, sequential, numerical order, be-
ginning with the number 101, except for initial de-
posits to open a new account or in case of lost or sto-
len checks when a limited supply of unnumbered 
counterchecks may be issued. Any person who vio-
lates this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
1983 
CHAPTER 2 
POSSESSION OF DEPOSITORY 
INSTITUTION BY 
COMMISSIONER 
Section 
7-2-1. Supervisory actions by commissioner — 
Grounds — Mergers or acquisitions au-
thorized by commissioner — Possession 
of business and property taken by com-
missioner . 
7-2-2. Jurisdiction of district court — Supervision 
of actions of commissioner in possession 
— Authority of commissioner and court. 
7-2-3. Action for injunction against commissioner 
in possession — Procedure — Appeal. 
7-2-4. Consent required for institution to resume 
business. 
7-2-5. Appointment of receiver or assignment for 
creditors — Notice required — Commis-
sioner taking possession. 
7-2-6. Notice of possession by commissioner — 
Presentation, allowance and disallow-
ance of claims — Objections to claims. 
7-2-7. Stay of proceedings against institution. 
7-2-8. Special deputies or agents — Appointment 
— Bond. 
7-2-9. Liquidation of institution — Appointment 
of liquidator or receiver. 
7-2-10. Inventory of assets — Listings of claims — 
Report of proceedings — Filing — Inspec-
tion. 
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Section 
7-2-13. Collections in liquidation — Deposit — 
Preference. 
7-2-14. Expenses during possession. 
7-2-15. Priority of obligations, expenses, and 
claims. 
7-2-16. Interim ratable dividends. 
7-2-17. Disposition of records after liquidation. 
7-2-18. Plan for reorganization or liquidation of in-
stitution — Hearings — Procedure — Ef-
fect — Appeals. 
7-2-19. Suspension of payments by institution — 
Order of commissioner — Approval of 
governor — Period effective — Exempt 
payments — Operation during suspen-
sion — Modification of orders — Adop-
tion of rules and regulations. 
7-2-20. Repealed. 
7-2-21. Applicability of Utah Procurement Code. 
7=2-22. Termination of authority to transact busi-
ness. 
7-2°l. Supervisory actions by commissioner — 
Grounds — Mergers or acquisitions 
authorised by commissioner — Posses-
sion of business and property taken by 
commissioner. 
(1) An institution under the jurisdiction of the de-
partment shall be subject to supervisory actions by 
the commissioner under this chapter or Chapter 19 if 
the commissioner, with or without an administrative 
hearing, finds that: 
(a) an officer of an institution or other person 
has refused to be examined or has made false 
statements under oath regarding its affairs; 
(b) an institution or other person has violated 
its articles of incorporation or any law, rule, or 
regulation governing the institution or other per-
son; 
(c) an institution or other person is conducting 
its business in an unauthorized or unsafe man-
ner, or is practicing deception upon its depositors, 
members, or the public, or is engaging in conduct 
injurious to its depositors, members, or the pub-
lic; 
(d) an institution or other person has been no-
tified by its primary account insurer of the in-
surer's intention to initiate proceedings to termi-
nate such insurance or is otherwise not in a 
sound and safe condition to transact its business; 
(e) an institution or other person has failed to 
maintain a minimum amount of capital as re-
quired by the department, any state, or the rele-
vant federal regulatory agency; 
(f) a depository institution has failed or re-
fused to pay its depositors in accordance with the 
terms under which the deposits were received, or 
has or is about to become insolvent; 
(g) an institution or other person or its officers 
or directors have failed or refused to comply with 
the terms of a duly and legally authorized order 
issued by the commissioner or by any federal au-
thority or authority of another state having juris-
diction over the institution or other person; 
(h) an institution or other person or its officers 
this title or any rule or regulation of the depart-
ment issued under it; 
(j) any person who controls an institution or 
other person subject to the jurisdiction of the de-
partment has used the control to cause the insti-
tution or other person to be or about to be in an 
unsafe or unsound condition, to conduct its busi-
ness in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, or to 
violate this title or any rule or regulation of the 
department issued under it; or 
(k) the remedies provided in Section 7-1-307, 
7-1-308, or 7-1-313 are ineffective or impractica-
ble to protect the interest of depositors, creditors, 
or members of the institution or other person, or 
to protect the interests of the public. 
(2) If the commissioner finds that any of the condi-
tions set forth in Subsections 7-2-l(l)(a) through (j) 
exist with respect to an institution under the jurisdic-
tion of the department, and if the commissioner also 
finds that an order issued pursuant to Section 
7-1-307, 7-1-308, or 7-1-313 would not adequately 
protect the interests of the institution's depositors, 
creditors, members, or other interested persons from 
all dangers presented by the conditions found to exist, 
or if two-thirds of the voting shares of an institution 
under the jurisdiction of the department which are 
eligible to be voted at any regular or special meeting 
of the shareholders of the institution duly called for 
that purpose are voted at the meeting in favor of a 
resolution consenting to the commissioner taking or 
causing to be taken any of the actions described be-
low, he may: 
(a) without taking possesson of the institution, 
authorize, or by order of the commissioner re-
quire or give effect to, the acquisition of control 
of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or a 
portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all 
or a portion of the liabilities of the institution or 
other person by any other institution or entity 
approved or designated by him in accordance 
with the provisions of Chapter 19; or 
(b) take possession of the institution or other 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the depart-
ment with or without a court order, if an acquisi-
tion of control of, a merger with, an acquisition of 
all or a portion of the assets of, or an assumption 
of all or a portion of the liabilities of the institu-
tion or other person without taking possession 
does not appear to him to be practicable. Upon 
taking possession, the commissioner is vested by 
operation of law with the title to and the right to 
possession of ail assets, the business, and prop-
erty of the institution or other person subject to 
court order made under Section 7-2-3. While in 
possession of an institution or other person, the 
commissioner, or any receiver or liquidator ap-
pointed by him, may exercise any or all of the 
rights, powers, and authorities granted to the 
commissioner under the provisions of this chap-
ter, or may give effect to the acquisition of con-
trol of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or a 
portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all 
or a portion of the liabilitv of an institution or 
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has all the powers and privileges provided by law 
with respect to the liquidation or receivership of 
an institution, its depositors, and other creditors, 
including but not limited to, entering into an 
agreement for the purchase of assets and as-
sumption of deposit and other liabilities by an-
other depository institution. Such action by a fed-
eral deposit insurance agency may be taken upon 
approval by the court, with or without prior no-
tice. Such actions or agreements may be disap-
proved, amended, or rescinded only upon a find-
ing by the court that the decisions or actions of 
the receiver or liquidator were arbitrary, capri-
cious, fraudulent, or contrary to law. 
(3) The liquidator or receiver may employ assis-
tants, agents, and legal counsel at reasonable com-
pensation determined by the liquidator or receiver 
and approved by the commissioner. All expenses inci-
dent to the liquidation or receivership shall be paid 
out of the assets of the institution. If a liquidator or 
receiver is not the guaranty corporation, the Utah 
Credit Union League, the Credit Union Insurance 
Corporation, or the applicable federal deposit insur-
ance agency, the liquidator or receiver and any assis-
tants and agents shall provide bond or other security 
approved by the commissioner for the faithful dis-
charge of their duties in connection with the liquida-
tion or receivership and the accounting for money 
handled by them. The cost of the bond shall be paid 
from the assets of the institution. Suit may be main-
tained on the bond by the commissioner, and if the 
institution is a member of the guaranty corporation, 
by the guaranty corporation, and if the institution is 
a member of the Credit Union Insurance Corporation, 
by the corporation, or by any person injured by a 
breach of the condition of the bond. 
(4) (a) Upon the appointment of a liquidator or re-
ceiver for an institution in possession pursuant to 
this chapter, the commissioner and the depart-
ment are exempt from liability or damages for 
any act or omission of any liquidator or receiver 
appointed pursuant to this section. 
(b) This section does not limit the right of the 
commissioner to prescribe and enforce rules reg-
ulating a liquidator or receiver in carrying out 
its duties with respect to an institution subject to 
the jurisdiction of the department. 1987 
7-2-10. Inventory of assets — Listings of claims 
— Report of proceedings — Filing — 
Inspection. 
As soon as is practical after taking possession of an 
institution the commissioner shall make or cause to 
be made in duplicate an inventory of its assets, one 
copy to be filed in his office and one with the clerk of 
the district court. Upon the expiration of the time 
fixed for presentation of claims the commissioner 
shall make in duplicate a full and complete list of the 
claims presented, including and specifying claims dis-
allowed by him, of which one copy shall be filed in his 
office and one copy in the office of the clerk of the 
district court. The commissioner shall in like manner 
make and file supplemental lists showing all claims 
presented after the filing of the first list. The supple-
mental lia+a aihall V\e> fHaA a\rnmj aiv m/M-i 
make a detailed report in duplicate of the proceeding, 
showing the disposition of each asset and acquired 
asset, one copy to be filed in his office and one with 
the clerk of the district court. The report, inventory, 
and lists of claims shall be open at all reasonable 
times for inspection. 1983 
7-2-lie Special counsel — Employment by attor-
ney general. 
Upon taking possession of any institution or other 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the department, 
the commissioner may request the attorney general 
to employ special counsel on his behalf to assist and 
advise him in connection with a liquidation or reorga-
nization proceeding and the prosecution or defense of 
any action or proceeding connected with it. 1983 
7-2-12. Powers of commissioner in possession — 
Sale of assets — Post-possession fi-
nancing — New deposit instruments — 
Executory contracts — Transfer of 
property — Avoidance of transfers — 
Avoidable preferences. 
(1) Upon taking possession of the institution, the 
commissioner may do all things necessary to preserve 
its assets and business, and shall rehabilitate, reorga-
nize, or liquidate the affairs of the institution in a 
manner he determines to be in the best interests of 
the institution's depositors and creditors. Any such 
determination by the commissioner may not be over-
ruled by a reviewing court unless it is found to be 
arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or contrary to law. 
In the event of a liquidation, he shall collect all debts 
due and claims belonging to it, and upon approval of 
the court may compromise all bad or doubtful debts. 
He may sell, upon terms he may determine, any or all 
of the property of the institution for cash or other 
consideration, subject to final approval of the court. 
The commissioner shall give such notice as the court 
may direct to the institution of the time and place of 
hearing upon an application to the court for approval 
of the sale. The commissioner shall execute and de-
liver to the purchaser of any property of the institu-
tion sold by him those deeds or instruments necessary 
to evidence the passing of title. 
(2) With approval of the court and upon terms and 
with priority determined by the court, the commis-
sioner may borrow money and issue evidence of in-
debtedness. To secure repayment of the indebtedness, 
he may mortgage, pledge, transfer in trust, or hy-
pothecate any or all of the property of the institution 
superior to any charge on the property for expenses of 
the proceeding as provided in Section 7-2-14. These 
loans may be obtained for the purpose of facilitating 
liquidation, protecting or preserving the assets in the 
charge of the commissioner, expediting the making of 
distributions to depositors and other claimants, aid-
ing in the reopening or reorganization of the institu-
tion or its merger or consolidation with another insti-
tution, or the sale of all of its assets. Neither the 
commissioner nor any special deputy or other person 
lawfully in charge of the affairs of the institution is 
under any personal obligation to repay those loans. 
The commissioner may take any action necessary or 
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shareholder of the institution or any depositor or 
other creditor of the institution may appear and be 
heard on the application. Prior to the obtaining of a 
court order, the commissioner or special deputy in 
charge of the affairs of the institution may make ap-
plication or negotiate for the loan or loans subject to 
the obtaining of the court order. 
(3) With the approval of the court pursuant to a 
plan of reorganization or liquidation under Section 
7-2-18, the commissioner may provide for depositors 
to receive new deposit instruments from a depository 
institution that purchases or receives some or all of 
the assets of the institution in the possession of the 
commissioner. All new deposit instruments issued by 
the acquiring depository institution may, in accor-
dance with the terms of the plan of reorganization or 
liquidation, be subject to different amounts, terms, 
and interest rates than the original deposit instru-
ments of the institution in the possession of the com-
missioner All deposit instruments issued by the ac-
quiring institution shall be considered new deposit 
obligations of the acquiring institution. The original 
deposit instruments issued by the institution in the 
possession of the commissioner are not liabilities of 
the acquiring institution? unless assumed by the ac-
quiring institution. Unpaid claims of depositors 
against the institution in the possession of the com-
missioner continue, and may be provided for in the 
plan of reorganization or liquidation. 
(4) The commissioner, after taking possession of 
any institution or other person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the department, may terminate any executory 
contract, including unexpired leases and unexpired 
employment contracts, to which the institution or 
other person is a party. If the termination of an exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease constitutes a breach 
of the contract or lease, the date of the breach is the 
date on which the commissioner took possession of 
the institution. 
(5) With approval of the court and upon a showing 
by the commissioner that it is in the best interests of 
the depositors and creditors, the commissioner may 
transfer property on account of an indebtedness in-
curred by the institution prior to the date of the tak-
ing. 
(6) (a) The commissioner may avoid any transfer 
of any interest of the institution in property or 
any obligation incurred by the institution that is 
void or voidable by a creditor under Chapter 1, 
Title 25. 
(b) The commissioner may avoid any transfer 
of any interest in real property of the institution 
that is void as against or voidable by a subse-
quent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real property or any 
portion thereof who has duly recorded his convey-
ance at the time possession of the institution is 
taken, whether or not such a purchaser exists. 
(c) The commissioner may avoid any transfer 
of any interest in property of the institution or 
any obligation incurred by the institution that is 
invalid or void as against, or is voidable by a 
creditor that extends credit to the institution at 
the time possession of the institution is taken by 
the commissionpr anH that rkH+ai«a «+ «™u ^ — 
unaffected by and without regard to any knowl-
edge of the commissioner or of any creditor of the 
institution. 
(e) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or in-
direct, absolute or conditional, voluntary or in-
voluntary, or disposing of or parting with prop-
erty or with an interest in property, including 
retention of title as a security interest. 
(f) The commissioner may avoid any transfer 
of any interest in property of the institution to or 
for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of 
an antecedent debt owed by the institution before 
such transfer was made, made or suffered by the 
institution while insolvent, on or within 120 days 
before the time possession of the institution is 
taken by the commissioner, or between 120 days 
and one year before the time possession is taken 
if the creditor at the time of such transfer had 
reasonable cause to believe that the institution 
was insolvent, the effect of which transfer will be 
to enable such creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than he would be entitled to 
under the provisions of Section 7-2-15. For the 
purposes of this subsection: 
(i) the institution is presumed to have 
been insolvent on and during the 120 days 
immediately preceding the time possession is 
taken by the commissioner; 
(ii) a transfer of any interest in real prop-
erty is deemed to have been made or suffered 
when it became so far perfected that a subse-
quent good faith purchaser of such property 
from the institution for a valuable consider-
ation could not acquire an interest superior 
to the transferee; and 
(iii) a transfer of property other than real 
property is deemed to have been made or suf-
fered when it became so far perfected that a 
creditor on a simple contract could not ac-
quire a lien by attachment, levy, execution, 
garnishment, or other judicial lien superior 
to the interest of the transferee. 1987 
7-2-13* Collections in liquidation — Deposit — 
Preference. 
The moneys collected in process of a liquidation by 
the commissioner shall be from time to time depos-
ited, subject to his order as herein provided, in one or 
more federally insured depository institutions orga-
nized under the laws of this state. In case of the sus-
pension or insolvency of the depository institution, 
these deposits shall be preferred before all other de-
posits. 1981 
7-2-14. Expenses during possession. 
The expenses reimbursable to the commissioner 
during possession or in the course of proceedings un-
der this chapter include the compensation of deputies, 
agents, clerks, and examiners employed by him and 
reasonable fees for counsel, accountants or consul-
tants employed by him or on his behalf. The compen-
sation shall be fixed by the commissioner subject to 
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This classification is final, subject to review by the 
court upon a timely objection filed under Subsection 
7-2-6(9). 1987 
7-2-16. Interim ratable dividends. 
At any time after the expiration of the date fixed 
for the presentation of claims and prior to the decla-
ration of a final dividend the commissioner may, out 
of the funds remaining in his hands after the pay-
ment of expenses, declare one or more interim ratable 
dividends, such dividends to be paid to such persons 
and in such amounts and upon such notice as may be 
directed by the court. 1981 
7-2-15. Priority of obligations, expenses, and 
claims. 
(1) The following obligations, expenses, and claims 
have the following priority: 
(a) first, any obligation the commissioner may 
have under Subsection 7-2-6(3)(b) to be bound by 
the terms, covenants, and conditions of obliga-
tions secured by assets or property of the institu-
tion; 
(b) second, administrative expenses, including 
those allowed under Section 7-2-14; 
(c) third, unsecured claims for wages, salaries, 
or commissions, including vacation, severance, or 
sick leave pay, earned by an individual within 90 
days before the date of the commissioner's posses-
sion in an amount not exceeding $2,000 for each 
individual; 
(d) fourth, claims of depositors, other than 
those of controlling persons, as defined in Section 
7-8a-9. Any federal deposit insurance agency or 
other deposit insurer is subrogated to all rights of 
the depositors to the extent of all payments made 
for the benefit of the depositors. The right of any 
agency of the United States insuring deposits or 
savings obligations to be subrogated to the rights 
of depositors upon payment of their claims may 
not be less extensive than the law of the United 
States requires as a condition of the authority to 
issue such insurance or make such payments to 
depositors of national banks; 
(e) fifth, all other unsecured claims in 
amounts allowed by the court, including claims 
of secured creditors to the extent the amount of 
their claims exceed the present fair market value 
of their collateral. The claim of a lessor for dam-
ages resulting from the termination of a lease of 
property may not be allowed in an amount in 
excess of the rent reserved by the lease, without 
acceleration, for 60 days after the lessor repos-
sessed the leased property, or the leased property 
was surrendered to the lessor, whichever first oc-
curs, whether before or after the commissioner 
took possession of the institution, plus any 
unpaid rent due under the lease, without acceler-
ation, on the date of possession or surrender. A 
claim for damages resulting from the termina-
tion of an employment contract, may not be al-
lowed in an amount in excess of the compensa-
tion provided by the contract, without accelera-
tion, for 90 days after the employee was directed 
to terminate, or the employee terminated, perfor-
mance under the contract, whichever first occurs, 
whether before or after the commissioner took 
possession of the institution, plus any unpaid 
compensation due under the contract, without ac-
celeration, on the date the employee was directed 
to terminate or the employee terminated perfor-
mance. Claims for damages resulting from the 
termination of employment contracts of persons 
who were in control of the institution within the 
meaning of Subsection 7-1-103(7) are not entitled 
to priority under this subsection; 
(f) sixth, claims for debt that are subordinated 
under the provisions of a subordination agree-
ment or other instrument: 
7-2-17. Disposition of records after liquidation. 
After liquidation of an institution under this chap-
ter, the commissioner shall dispose of its books, pa-
pers, and records in accordance with the order of the 
court. i9Si 
7-2-18. Plan for reorganization or liquidation of 
institution — Hearings — Procedure — 
Effect — Appeals. 
(1) If the commissioner has taken possession of any 
institution or other person under the jurisdiction of 
the department he may propose to the court a plan for 
the reorganization or liquidation of the institution or 
the establishment of a new institution by filing a pe-
tition with the court, setting forth the details of the 
plan and requesting the court to set a day for hearing 
on the petition. 
(2) The court shall make an order fixing a day for 
the hearing of the petition, prescribing the manner in 
which notice of the hearing is given, and may pre-
scribe a deadline for filing written objections. The 
court may adjourn the hearing from time to time and 
no further notice is required. At the time of hearing 
or any adjournment of a hearing the court shall take 
testimony, and if it appears that it is in the best inter-
ests of the depositors and other creditors, the court 
shall approve the plan. 
(3) A plan of reorganization or liquidation ap-
proved by the court shall be fully binding upon and 
constitute a final adjudication of all claims, rights, 
and interests of all depositors, creditors, share-
holders, and members of the institution being reorga-
nized or liquidated, and all other parties in interest 
with regard to the plan and with regard to any insti-
tution or other person receiving any assets or assum-
ing any liabilities under the plan. 
(4) Notice of an appeal of an order approving a plan 
of reorganization or liquidation shall be filed within 
ten days after the date of entry of the order appealed 
from. 1986 
7-2-19. Suspension of payments by institution — 
Order of commissioner — Approval of 
governor — Period effective — Exempt 
payments — Operation during suspen-
sion — Modification of orders — Adop-
tion of rules and regulations. 
(1) The commissioner, whenever in his opinion the 
action is necessary in the public interest, may, if the 
governor approves, order such institutions as are sub-
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tended from time to time for further periods not ex-
ceeding 60 days each. 
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect 
the right of the institutions to pay current operating 
expenses and other liabilities incurred during a pe-
riod of suspension. 
(4) Whenever in the opinion of the commissioner 
conditions warrant such action, he may, if the gover-
nor approves, authorize the issuance of clearing 
house certificates, post notes or other evidences of 
indebtedness, either during a period of suspension, or 
during such longer period as he may prescribe, and 
during a period of suspension, he may permit the sus-
pended institution to receive deposits and may autho-
rize any such institution to pay any part of its liabili-
ties, or of any class thereof, payment of which has 
been suspended. 
(5) He may, if the governor approves, at any time, 
by order, modify or rescind any or all previous orders 
made by him under authority of this chapter. 
(6) The commissioner may, if the governor ap-
proves, prescribe such rules and regulations as he 
considers necessary in order to carry out the provi-
sions of this chapter, and an order may be issued on 
such terms and conditions as may be incorporated in 
the order. 1381 
7-2-20. Repealed. 1987 
7-2-21. Applicability of Utah Procurement 
Code. 
No action of the commissioner taken under this 
chapter or Chapter 19 is subject to the provisions of 
Chapter 56, Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code. 
1986 
7-2-22. Termination of authority to transact 
business. 
If an institution or other person subject to the juris-
diction of the department is operated by a federal 
deposit insurance agency or its appointee pursuant to 
a federal receivership or conservatorship for a period 
of 180 days or more, the authority of that institution 
or person to transact business under this title shall 
terminate upon the expiration of the 180-day period 
1987 
CHAPTER 3 
BANKS 
Section 
7-3-1. Application of chapter. 
7-3-2. Restrictions on conduct of banking busi-
ness and bank holding companies. 
7-3-3. "Banking business" defined. 
7-3-4 to 7-3-9. Repealed. 
7-3-10. Powers, rights, and privileges of banking 
corporation — Other business activities. 
7-3-11. Certificate of incorporation — Prerequi-
sites to issuance. 
7-3-12. Prohibited investments and loans. 
7-3-13. Changes in articles of incorporation re-
stricted. 
7-3-14. Capital stock increase — Prerequisites. 
Section 
7-3-19. Limitations on loans and extensions 
credit. 
7-3-20. Bank acquiring, holding, or accepting 
collateral its own stock — Loans to 
investment in affiliates. 
7-3-21. Stock ownership by banks. 
7-3-22. Certificates and evidences of deposit bin* 
ing — Issuance of items intended to cir 
culate as money prohibited. 
7-3-23. Repealed. 
7-3-24. Certification of check. 
7-3-25. Bad debts. 
7-3-26. Overdraft as asset. 
7-3-27. Repealed. 
7-3-28. Capital notes or debentures. 
7-3-29. Repealed. 
7-3-30. Board of directors to manage business — 
Residency of directors. 
7-3-31. Oath of bank directors. 
7-3-32. Meetings of board of directors — Reports — 
Records — Loans to officers, directors 
and principal shareholders. 
7-3-33. Examination of affairs by board of directors 
— Purposes — Frequency — Report filed 
in bank records. 
7-3-34. Contents of examination report of board of 
directors — Failure to make and file re-
port as misdemeanor. 
7-3-35. Examinations in lieu of directors' examina-
tion — Report filed with board minutes. 
7-3-36. Loans to officers, directors and stock-
holders. 
7-3-37, 7-3-38. Repealed. 
7-3-39. Shareholders' right to examine bank 
records — Records as to a particular cus-
tomer. 
7-3-1. Application of chapter. 
This chapter applies to all banks organized under 
the laws of this state, to all other banks doing busi-
ness in this state as permitted by the laws and Con-
stitution of the United States, and to all persons con-
ducting banking business in this state except as pro-
vided in Chapter 1. 1981 
7-3-2. Restrictions on conduct of banking busi-
ness and bank holding companies. 
(1) The establishment or operation in this state of 
private or partnership banks is expressly prohibited. 
(2) Except as authorized by Chapter 19, Title 7, 
Section 7-1-702, or as specifically authorized by the 
laws of the United States by language to that effect 
and not merely by implication: 
(a) No corporation or other business entity or-
ganized other than under the laws of this state 
may establish or maintain an office or other 
place of business in this state at which banking 
business is conducted. 
(b) No corporation or other business entity or-
ganized other than under the laws of this state 
may conduct a banking business in this state un-
less it complies with all laws of this state relating 
to banks, to the conduct of a banking business, 
